<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: The More Speech, The Better?</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.1115.org/2007/03/26/the-more-speech-the-better/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.1115.org/2007/03/26/the-more-speech-the-better/</link>
	<description></description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 09 Feb 2012 21:49:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3</generator>
	<item>
		<title>By: Adam B.</title>
		<link>http://www.1115.org/2007/03/26/the-more-speech-the-better/comment-page-1/#comment-47378</link>
		<dc:creator>Adam B.</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Mar 2007 15:01:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.1115.org/2007/03/26/the-more-speech-the-better/#comment-47378</guid>
		<description>Thanks for the kind words.  God forbid something happens to me, send that first paragraph to whoever&#039;s writing the obit. :)

[It pays to self-Google]

As to the substance, we&#039;ve got a long history in this country of protecting anonymous political speech in this country, and I&#039;d turn your attention to &lt;a href=&quot;http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/93-986.ZS.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;the Supreme Court&#039;s decision in the 1995 McIntyre case&lt;/a&gt;, where Justice Stevens directly addressed the &quot;false speech&quot; point.  Basically, the Court said, you can ban false speech without banning all anonymous speech, and Ohio couldn&#039;t justify banning the latter group just to prevent the former.  Excerpt:

&quot;The state interest in preventing fraud and libel stands on a different footing. We agree with Ohio&#039;s submission that this interest carries special weight during election campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse consequences for the public at large. Ohio does not, however, rely solely on Â§3599.09(A) to protect that interest. Its Election Code includes detailed and specific prohibitions against making or disseminating false statements during political campaigns. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Â§Â§3599.09.1(B), 3599.09.2(B) (1988). These regulations apply both to candidate elections and to issue driven ballot measures. [n.12] Thus, Ohio&#039;s prohibition of anonymous leaflets plainly is not its principal weapon against fraud. [n.13] Rather, it serves as an aid to enforcement of the specific prohibitions and as a deterrent to the making of false statements by unscrupulous prevaricators. Although these ancillary benefits are assuredly legitimate, we are not persuaded that they justify Â§3599.09(A)&#039;s extremely broad prohibition. 

&quot;As this case demonstrates, the prohibition encompasses documents that are not even arguably false or misleading. It applies not only to the activities of candidates and their organized supporters, but also to individuals acting independently and using only their own modest resources. [n.14] It applies not only to elections of public officers, but also to ballot issues that present neither a substantial risk of libel nor any potential appearance of corrupt advantage. [n.15] It applies not only to leaflets distributed on the eve of an election, when the opportunity for reply is limited, but also to those distributed months in advance. [n.16] It applies no matter what the character or strength of the author&#039;s interest in anonymity. Moreover, as this case also demonstrates, the absence of the author&#039;s name on a document does not necessarily protect either that person or a distributor of a forbidden document from being held responsible for compliance with the election code. Nor has the State explained why it can more easily enforce the direct bans on disseminating false documents against anonymous authors and distributors than against wrongdoers who might use false names and addresses in an attempt to avoid detection. We recognize that a State&#039;s enforcement interest might justify a more limited identification requirement, but Ohio has shown scant cause for inhibiting the leafletting at issue here.&quot;

Feel free to email me to discuss further.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for the kind words.  God forbid something happens to me, send that first paragraph to whoever&#8217;s writing the obit. :)</p>
<p>[It pays to self-Google]</p>
<p>As to the substance, we&#8217;ve got a long history in this country of protecting anonymous political speech in this country, and I&#8217;d turn your attention to <a href="http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/93-986.ZS.html" rel="nofollow">the Supreme Court&#8217;s decision in the 1995 McIntyre case</a>, where Justice Stevens directly addressed the &#8220;false speech&#8221; point.  Basically, the Court said, you can ban false speech without banning all anonymous speech, and Ohio couldn&#8217;t justify banning the latter group just to prevent the former.  Excerpt:</p>
<p>&#8220;The state interest in preventing fraud and libel stands on a different footing. We agree with Ohio&#8217;s submission that this interest carries special weight during election campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse consequences for the public at large. Ohio does not, however, rely solely on Â§3599.09(A) to protect that interest. Its Election Code includes detailed and specific prohibitions against making or disseminating false statements during political campaigns. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Â§Â§3599.09.1(B), 3599.09.2(B) (1988). These regulations apply both to candidate elections and to issue driven ballot measures. [n.12] Thus, Ohio&#8217;s prohibition of anonymous leaflets plainly is not its principal weapon against fraud. [n.13] Rather, it serves as an aid to enforcement of the specific prohibitions and as a deterrent to the making of false statements by unscrupulous prevaricators. Although these ancillary benefits are assuredly legitimate, we are not persuaded that they justify Â§3599.09(A)&#8217;s extremely broad prohibition. </p>
<p>&#8220;As this case demonstrates, the prohibition encompasses documents that are not even arguably false or misleading. It applies not only to the activities of candidates and their organized supporters, but also to individuals acting independently and using only their own modest resources. [n.14] It applies not only to elections of public officers, but also to ballot issues that present neither a substantial risk of libel nor any potential appearance of corrupt advantage. [n.15] It applies not only to leaflets distributed on the eve of an election, when the opportunity for reply is limited, but also to those distributed months in advance. [n.16] It applies no matter what the character or strength of the author&#8217;s interest in anonymity. Moreover, as this case also demonstrates, the absence of the author&#8217;s name on a document does not necessarily protect either that person or a distributor of a forbidden document from being held responsible for compliance with the election code. Nor has the State explained why it can more easily enforce the direct bans on disseminating false documents against anonymous authors and distributors than against wrongdoers who might use false names and addresses in an attempt to avoid detection. We recognize that a State&#8217;s enforcement interest might justify a more limited identification requirement, but Ohio has shown scant cause for inhibiting the leafletting at issue here.&#8221;</p>
<p>Feel free to email me to discuss further.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>

