Washington Times, May 13:

U.S. intelligence agencies suspect Syria was offered and received nuclear weapons technology from the covert Pakistani supplier group headed by A.Q. Khan, according to an intelligence report.

An annual report to Congress on arms proliferation states that Pakistani investigators have confirmed reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency that the Khan network “offered nuclear technology and hardware to Syria.”
[…]
(This) is the first time the Bush administration has publicly linked Syria to Khan.
[…]
President Bush has said that the Khan network supplied nuclear goods to Libya, Iran and North Korea.
[…]
“In 2004 Syria continued to develop civilian nuclear capabilities, including uranium extraction technology and hot cell facilities, which may also be potentially applicable to a weapons program,” the report said.

The report also said China is a “key supplier” of nuclear, missile and weapons of mass destruction goods to states of concern.

Chinese companies “continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects and firms in China provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, or assistance to Libya and North Korea,” the report said.

Chinese language documents found in Libya revealed that the Khan network had supplied it with nuclear warhead design information. China’s government has not said how its warhead information made its way from Pakistan to Libya.

China supplied most of the uranium-enrichment technology and bomb designs that allowed Pakistan in 1998 to become a declared nuclear power. The proliferation was a violation of China’s obligation to the NPT but Beijing was never punished for the activities.

Interesting how one short little article manages to underline most of what is seriously wrong with what passes for our nuclear proliferation policy.

We use nuclear proliferation as a stick to beat selected countries over the head with, as and when it suits us. But what we are pleased to call our policy initiatives, are robbed of any moral force they might otherwise have had, by the glaring things we turn a blind eye to. We vainly keep trying to exert moral force anyway. All we achieve, of course, is loss of face.

A.Q. Khan sets up shop to sell nuclear technology. He ends up selling it to not just anyone, but to certified axis-of-evil countries. Our response is that we allow Pakistan to allow him to pretty much get away with it. He is never arrested, never prosecuted, never even interrogated except by the Pakistani authorities. Instead he is “publicly disgraced”, but allowed to keep all his ill gotten gains, and to live a life of luxury in what the Pakistani government calls “protective custody”. We resolutely look the other way throughout, as this stranger-than-fiction true story unfolds.

Now that this Syria story has come out, we will no doubt offer our standard ritualistic denunciations, of both A.Q. Khan and Syria. And then go back to the practiced somnolence that effectively constitutes our policy.

(Let it also be noted for the record that the Syria story didn’t come out through the interrogation of A.Q. Khan by Pakistani authorities. It came out because the IAEA got onto it somehow. Once the cat was out of the bag, Pakistani investigators had no trouble confirming the story. Unfortunately, it is not recorded whether anyone in the Pakistan government gave a speech saying “I’m shocked, shocked, I tell you”.)

China lays the egg that hatches into the Islamic nuclear bomb. China establishes itself as the key supplier of “nuclear, missile and weapons of mass destruction goods to states of concern”. And we don’t even go through the motions of making ritualistic denunciations. We just keep on making good with them.

Maybe if we had had a consistent, coherent policy of opposing nuclear proliferation, maybe if we had championed a program of strict international sanctions against every country found to be responsible for supplying nuclear weapons technology or materials to non-nuclear-weapon states, then maybe North Korea wouldn’t be where it is today. Maybe Iran wouldn’t be where it is.

But Iran, by all accounts, has a long way to go before it comes up with a nuclear weapon. If we were to embrace even now a consistent, coherent policy of opposing nuclear proliferation, if we were to champion even now a program of strict international sanctions against every country found to be responsible for supplying nuclear weapons technology or materials to non-nuclear-weapon states, we might still be able to effectively obstruct Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

But if our policy consists of just calling on Iran to cease and desist from uranium enrichment etc., and trying to have the UN call on them to cease and desist etc., but looking the other way every time A. Q. Khan, or China, or someone else, helps them along their chosen path, then it’s just a matter of time before Iran is so far along that path that all the possible outcomes will be very bad outcomes indeed. It’s not clear why we are so determined to let it come to that.

(Let’s recognize that the answer cannot be: “so that Bush can use it as a pretext to invade Iran”. For the simple reason that Bush will be long gone – and hopefully as disgraced as A.Q. Khan – by the time things reach such a pass.)