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April 22, 2004: Pat Tillman is shot and killed by a hail of bullets on a road near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

The Pentagon propaganda machine swings into action. Media outlets from sea to shining sea will come to trumpet the story of the tragic but glorious death by enemy fire of this great and glorious true American hero, cut down in his prime by enemy fire while actively engaged in being brave and glorious. The saving grace, of course, is that he went the way he would have wanted to, he gave his life for the great and glorious cause he believed in.

Poor sucker. What he was actually signing on for did not uniquely comport with what he believed or what he believed in. The true version of his death: ripped to shreds by members of his own platoon who were engaged in acting like a bunch of blind men in a dark room hunting for a black cat which wasn’t even there.

April 30, 2004: U.S. Army Special Operations Command releases a stirring but entirely fictitious account of the incident, a fine tale of how Tillman was cut down by enemy fire while shouting out orders to his men. Tillman is posthumously awarded a Silver Star for combat valor.

Of course, as a Corporal, Tillman was not exactly a senior commander on the scene. It turns out “his men” – the only men on the scene under his command – consisted of one Ranger and an Afghan militiaman.

Turns out that by this date investigators in Afghanistan had already taken at least 14 sworn statements from Tillman’s platoon members that made clear the true story of his death. By this date, Gen. John P. Abizaid, commander of US forces in the Middle East, and other top Army officials, were already aware that Tillman’s death had resulted from friendly fire.

May 3, 2004: The Pentagon propaganda machine orchestrates an exquisitely produced nationally televised memorial for Pat Tillman.

Not a dry eye in the house, of course. Which was the whole point. (Abizaid probably shed a tear, too. Or two – one out of sentimentality, and one out of guilt?)

May 29, 2004: True details of Tillman’s death are finally revealed, to Tillman’s family and to the public.

June 9, 2005: After Tillman’s parents harshly criticize the delay in informing them of the true circumstances of their son’s death, the Army apologizes:

While procedural misjudgments and mistakes contributed to an air of suspicion, no one intended to deceive the Tillman family or the public as to the cause of his death.

So the Army’s position would seem to be: yes, we deceived them, and we may have done it knowingly, but it was unintentional. Makes perfect sense to me. The intent was only to milk this for all it was worth. Deceiving the family and the public was only the means to achieve the intent, not the intent itself. A perfectly sensible use of the word unintentional.

August 23, 2005: The Pentagon announces that in response to the Tillman family’s bitter public complaints, the Department of Defense Inspector General’s Office is launching a review of the previous flawed investigation into the death of Pat Tillman.

March 4, 2006: The US army announces that as a result of the Inspector General’s review, it will now launch a criminal investigation into the death of Pat Tillman. “We are obligated to answer the family’s questions, as we are with all grieving families,” said Colonel Joseph Curtin, an Army spokesman (apparently with a straight face). “We want to do the right thing for the family,” Curtin said. “We owe it to the family. We owe them the truth.”

Later, when we give praise where praise is due, let it be remembered that they figured this out in less than two years.

Over the last two years, the Washington Post has provided most of the major reporting on this story. Their final word (for now) is:

(The) first Army investigator who looked into the shooting discovered within days of the incident that Tillman had been killed by his fellow Rangers, in what he concluded was an act of “gross negligence,”
[…]
The investigator later complained to Army officials that, in subsequent investigations, he felt the military chain of command had allowed soldiers to change their stories to protect individuals, and that the punishments did not square with his finding of gross negligence. Seven soldiers were given various administrative punishments for violations such as dereliction of duty; a team leader was cited for failing to effectively command and control the fire and movement of his Rangers.

To date the army has not felt obligated to conduct any investigation into possible wrong-doing by higher-ups in the chain of command. Apparently, at some point “not looking bad” trumps “what we owe the family”. Apparently, it is unthinkable to even reprimand Abizaid for knowing right away that the Army had lied and for doing nothing about it. Apparently, it is unthinkable to punish the higher ups who suborned and condoned the falsification of facts, who conspired to cover up the truth.

That’s just how we conduct our great and glorious wars. How would they be great and glorious if we didn’t?