1115.org

As if taking their cues from Orwell himself, both the President and Vice President have in recent weeks accused their opponents of revising history. Certainly the irony is not lost on those who have followed the administration’s own shifting rationales for war, but irony doesn’t even begin to cover the policy shift that is now underway just days after the assault on “revisionist historians.”

With both their sharp criticism of Congressman John Murtha and subsequent retreat to higher ground still echoing, plans to withdraw troops from Iraq first leaked from the military, and were then confirmed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Given General George Casey’s own assessment of the Iraqi army’s readiness and self-sufficiency, Rice’s statement seems particularly misguided. Consider:

Casey (7/28/05):

“I do believe we’ll still be able to take some fairly substantial reductions after these elections in the spring and summer.”

Casey (9/28/05):

“I think right now we’re in a period of a little greater uncertainty than when I was asked that question back in July and March…It’s too soon to tell.”

Casey(9/30/05):

“Iraqi armed forces will not have an independent capability for some time.”

Rice (11/22/05):

“I suspect that the — that American forces are not going to be needed in the numbers that they’re there for all that much longer, because Iraqis are continuing to make progress, in function, not just in numbers, but in their capabilities to do certain functions.”

It’s impossible to know if Murtha’s comments (or behind-the-scenes maneuvering) led to the administration’s new embrace of troop reductions, or if they have been paying more attention to polls than they’d like to admit, but it’s clear that change is afoot. But is that even good news?

In February of 2003, just weeks before the rushed invasion of Iraq, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki briefed the Senate Armed Services Committee on troop levels:

Iraq is “a piece of geography that’s fairly significant.” He said any postwar occupying force would have to be big enough to maintain safety in a country with “ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems.”

In response to questioning by Sen. Carl Levin of Michigan, the senior Democrat on the committee, Shinseki said he couldn’t give specific numbers of the size of an occupation force but would rely on the recommendations of commanders in the region.

“How about a range?” said Levin.

“I would say that what’s been mobilized to this point, something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers,” the general said. “Assistance from friends and allies would be helpful.”

Shinseki, the former commander of peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, (like Iraq, no stranger to ethnic hatred) would come to regret those words, not because he was wrong, but because his politically inconvenient calculation led to a forced early retirement. And political convenience has trumped everything in the Iraq war. Big Bold Bush likes to pretend that moral clarity and decisive action drive his Presidency, but Shinseki was effectively fired for suggesting that more troops were needed and economic advisor Larry Lindsay was fired for predicting that the war would cost $200 billion. Intelligent analysis was superseded by political concerns. With an economy not yet recovered from recession, the administration allowed no specific comment on war expenditures. With armed forces still fighting in Afghanistan, they relied on below-the-line methods to amass the fighting force, knowing that they could never get to 200,000, much less “several hundred thousand.” Tours were extended, Guard and reserve units were used in place of regular army, the practice of trading green cards for service increased, and mercenaries were contracted to provide security, all in an effort to minimize the number of Americans impacted.

Most have accepted that nothing can be done about the war’s cost, but the same can not be said about troop levels. Aside from the neo-conservatives who had been pushing for war in Iraq for 12 years, no one thought that 100,000 troops would be enough to secure Iraq. Even the 150,000 there now ostensibly to provide “extra security” can’t do more than put out fires on a rotating basis. There is simply no argument that can be made in support of the position that there were ever enough troops in Iraq, and the past conduct of the war, like its future, comes down to the same cold hard math.

The President is fond of his little slogans, and the one we’ve been hearing most often lately is “as Iraqis stand up, we’ll stand down.” Given the withdrawal plans drawn up by military planners, Rice’s suggestion that we won’t be needed much longer, and an upcoming speech by the President expected to “herald the improved readiness of Iraqi troops,” it would lead casual observers to believe the end was near. But if that was the case, why was the response to Murtha’s plan so pitched when a simple “we’re headed there anyway” would have sufficed? That’s politics, what about the math?

Since the end of “major combat operations” in mid-2003, we’ve heard variations on Iraqi troop target levels of 100-125,000. General Casey admitted that the Iraq army went from three independent battalions of 700 troops to one as of late September. It’s clear that the current 150,000 American troops aren’t enough. It’s clear that a paltry (and falling) percentage of Iraqi troops are able to operate on their own. If the administration makes good on their plan to remove 40-50,000 American troops, they will place the remaining 100,000 in grave danger. Since they have consistently refused to do what’s necessary and institute a draft to provide the force size needed to truly pacify Iraq because it would be politically inconvenient, they should remove all the troops. Half measures and unrealistic projections may help in the polls, but they are examples of actual disservices to the troops in the field. It’s way too late for the administration to revise away their mistakes; that shouldn’t stop them from making smarter decisions now.