1115.org

Ever since the Abu Ghraib prison scandal broke, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has kept a relatively low profile. Where he was once a reliable face of the administration, appearing on numerous talk shows and providing dozens of soundbites, his visibility dropped as calls for his resignation rose.

Last week’s release of the Schlesinger and Fay reports, which investigated the circumstances leading up to the Iraqi prisoner abuse, thrust Rumsfeld back into the limelight. While neither report calls for the Defense Secretary’s resignation, they do condemn Rumsfeld and other senior commanders for failing to provide adequate leadership and oversight.

Senior leaders did not establish clear guidelines on permissible techniques for interrogating various categories of prisoners held at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere in Iraq, the report said.

Rumsfeld might have avoided confusion over interrogation policy in the months after Baghdad fell in April 2003 if he had had a wider range of legal opinions and a more robust internal debate over detainee policies and operations in 2002, before the war started, the report said.

The reports point to a larger problem than just a few rogue soldiers, as the administration would like everyone to believe. But, as we all know, with this group truth is just a small speedbump on the road of public relations. By Friday, Rumsfeld was already misrepresenting the reports. In a radio interview and news conference, he claimed that none of the abuses were the result of interrogation techniques. In fact, the reports explicitly contradict that statement, showing that roughly a third (13 of 44) of the abuses were related to interrogations. Even when corrected by an aide, Rumsfeld still couldn’t tell the truth, claiming that interrogation-related abuses numbered “two or three”. Why is this important? Because if abuses happened during interrogations, it expands the scope of responsibility far beyond a few low-level grunts.

Both the four-member independent panel and the Army inquiry, whose principal investigator was Maj. Gen. George R. Fay, found that military intelligence personnel committed many of the offenses, including some in interrogations.

The Fay report found, for example, that in 16 of the 44 abuse cases the inquiry cited, military intelligence personnel encouraged, condoned or solicited military police officers to commit abuses, from using dogs to terrorize prisoners to placing detainees in dark, poorly ventilated cells that were freezing cold or sweltering hot. In 11 other cases they committed abuses themselves.

Of course, when the Pentagon was asked about this discrepancy, the response was as expected: 1) Rumsfeld simply misspoke; and 2) it’s the media’s fault. “That The New York Times would find the secretary’s misstatement and the subsequent effort to set the record straight is of interest is a shameless example of news that is sought during the dog days of August in Washington,” said Pentagon spokesman Eric Ruff. But this is a fairly significant detail to get wrong, and trying to sweep it all away in this fashion is about as lame as claiming that the dog ate his homework.

In any case, this is just another example of the Bush Administration’s usual response to a looming scandal���simply say the opposite and pass the blame, and by the time people figure it out the story will be long dead. In a perfect world, someone would stand up and call them on their bullshit. In a perfect world, they would acknowledge mistakes and take full responsibility for them, so that necessary changes could be made. Yeah…like that will happen.